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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JA~IES M. ALEXANDER, R. C. 
ALLRED, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD 
HACKING and STEW ART M. 
HANSON, COMMISSIONERS OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSI-
NESS REGULATION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
8471 
Brief of Defendants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants essentially agree to the Statement of 
Facts of the plaintiffs but not to the conclusions of the 
plaintiffs set forth therein. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE APPLIED FOR LICENSES TO 
TREAT HUMAN AILMENTS WITHOUT DRUGS OR 
MEDICINE AND WITHOUT OPERATIVE SURGERY; 
AND THEY MUST USE THE NAME OF THEIR SCHOOL 
IN THEIR LICENSE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF A STATUTE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY; THE LICENSING STATUTES ARE UNAM-
BIGUOUS. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE 
OBSTETRICS; AND IF SO QUALIFIED, THEY CANNOT 
USE DRUGS, MEDICINE OR SURGERY. 
POINT IV 
THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
REGISTRATION IS NOT A LICENSE REVOCATION 
PROCEEDING, BUT MERELY ONE TO MAKE THE 
LICENSE ISSUED CONFORM TO THE LAW. 
ARGU~IEXT 
POIXT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE APPLIED FOR LICENSES TO 
TREAT HUMAN AILMENTS WITHOUT DRUGS OR 
MEDICINE AND WITHOUT OPERATIVE SURGERY; 
AND THEY MUST USE THE NAME OF THEIR SCHOOL 
IN THEIR LICENSE. 
All of the plaintiffs haYc made application for license 
under tlw proYi ~ions of S~_•ction ;)8-l~-~. Utah Code .Anno-
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tated 1953 (or under similar provision in prior laws), 
which reads in part as follows : 
''Every applicant for such license must: 
* * ol(' 
"(2) Designate in his application whether he 
desires to practice medicine and surgery in all 
branches thereof or to treat human ailments 
without the use of drugs or medicine and without 
operative surgery. If he desires to treat human 
ailments without the use of drugs or medicines 
and without operative surgery, the designation 
shall be in accordance with the tenets of the pro-
fessional school, college or institution of which 
he is a graduate." 
It is to be noted that plaintiffs failed to cite or 
explain the foregoing statute in their brief. A mere read-
ing of the section shows clearly that the Legislature 
intended that the applicant for the license designate the 
scope of his intended practice, and all of these plaintiffs 
have applied for a license to practice the treatment of 
human ailments without the use of drugs or medicine and 
withotttt operative surgery. 
It is also to be noted that the foregoing section 
makes only two classifications. It does not mention 
naturopaths, chiropractors, or any other of many ''drug-
less healers.'' The only place the names of the various 
healing groups come to the forefront is by the applicant 
designating which name his school used. The statutes 
of our state do not otherwise authorize the issuance of 
a license to "naturopathic physicians.'' 
When the foregoing section is rea(l 111 conjunction 
with Section ;}8-J :2-:1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, it be-
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comes clear that when subsection (3) says: 
''To practice the treatment of human ailments 
without the use of drugs or medicine and without 
operative surgery in accordance with the tenets 
of the professional school, college or institution 
of which the applicant is a graduate as designated 
in his application for license, * * * '' 
the Legislature had in mind only appending the proper 
name to the license and did not have in mind the grant-
ing of broad additional rights to practice. The plaintiffs 
would have us believe that the foregoing subsection is 
an "escalator" type provision which -would enable the 
'' drugless healer'' groups to change the curriculum of 
their professional schools and thus ipso facto change or 
enlarge the scope of their practice even to the dispensing 
of drugs, medicine and performing surgery. Such a 
construction flies in the face of the prohibitive part of 
both of the foregoing sections which states that the 
practice shall be "without drugs or medicine and 1cifh-
out operative surgery." 
In addition, the applicants ha-ve all designated that 
they ·were applying for a license to "treat human ail-
ments \Yithout the use of drugs or medicine and without 
operatiYe surgery" and they should be so limited. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF A STATUTE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY; THE LICENSING STATUTES ARE UNAM-
BIGUOUS. 
The plaintiffs urge that there is an ambiguity in the 
~tatnl<' and that now, by long administrative interpre-
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tation, the plaintiffs have gained rights not specified in 
the licensing statutes. If any strength is to be given to 
this proposition, then the plaintiffs should lose because, 
since at least 1921 to lVIay, 1939, the same essential 
licensing provisions of our laws were uniformly construed 
by the Department of Business Regulation so as to ex-
clude the use of drugs, medicine, and surgery, to which 
construction many of the plaintiffs gave their assent by 
many years of licensing. Then in JVIay, 1939, the first 
licenses were issued which included obstetrics and minor 
surgery. However, the Department challenged the issu-
ance of said licenses (p. 6 of petition; p. 13 of plaintiffs' 
brief; p. 9 of petition), but later the Department acqui-
esced in the opinions of the Attorney General (p. 8 of 
petition), but now the Department of Business Regula-
tion has gone back to its pre-1939 position of interpre-
tation. The most striking fact to be gained from the 
scrutiny of the record of administrative interpretation 
after 1939 is that there has not been any consistent, uni-
form, long-continued interpretation of the licensing sta-
tute in question. 
vVhat happened to the licensing provisions in 1939, 
so that new licenses were issued to these plaintiffs who 
were completely outside the scope of ''drug less healing~'' 
There was not any basic change in the ]icensing law in 
1939! Section 58-12-2 and Section 58-12-3 were not 
changed. Ho,Ycver, a nmv section (Section 58-12-22) was 
enacted which tightened up the educational requirements 
for "naturopathic physicians." Section 58-12-2 ( 3) pro-
vides that an applicant for a license to treat human ail-
ments y;ithout the nse of drugs or meclieine and \Yithout 
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operative surgery must "Have the preliminary and pro-
fessional education hereinafter provided for." The mere 
fact that the Legislature saw fit to require more educa-
tion for a particular group of practitioners does not mean 
that by amending or adding to those requirements, the 
scope of their licenses was enlarged. This change in the 
educational requirement for "naturopathic physicians" 
apparently caused some uncertainty in the Department 
but it has now returned to its earlier construction of the 
licensing law. 
Plaintiffs concede that an administrative interpreta-
tion is not binding on the Court (p. 45 of brief). It must 
also be recognized that even the administrative interpre-
tation of an ambiguous statute is no more than persua-
sive to the Court because otherwise the Court would be 
ousted of its jurisdiction to review the actions of inferior 
tribunals. Further, if plaintiffs' argument be sound, then 
an administratiYe agency is powerless to correct its 
mistakes! That is not the law in "Ctah. 
However, in this case, the plaintiffs are trying to 
compel the defendant agency to take an interpretation 
of a statute \Yhich it has repudiated. Certainly, the Court 
is free to decide ·what the law is without any concern as 
to what the aclministratiYe agency thinks the law is, and 
where the agency has changed its mind as to the inter-
pretation, the former interpretation can certainly haYe 
no binding force on the Court. 
The plaintiffs have searched diligently for some 
ambiguity in thP licensing statutes which would justify 
the application of tlw "contempornneon~ administratiYe 
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interpretation" rule. The plantiffs cite Section 58-1-5, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as in some manner creating 
an ambiguity. We submit that it does not do so. Both 
chiropractors and naturopaths have their representative 
committees, as well as the other committee to represent 
those who want t_o treat human ailments without drugs 
or medicine and without operative surgery. The only 
significance this fact seems to have is that chiropractors 
and naturopaths have become so numerous and so well 
identified that it seemed proper to the Legislature to 
give them representative committees to assist the De-
partment of Business Regulation. It still is basic that 
the only place that these groups are authorized to be 
licensed is under Section 58-12-2 in the category of those 
who apply for a license to "treat human ailments without 
the use of drugs or medicine and without operative sur-
gery." It may be supposed that if some other "drug less 
healer'' group becomes cohesive and well identified, they 
also may have a representative committee. However, 
it would appear obvious that the mere fact that a group 
has a representative committee does not give that com-
mittee authority to enlarge the scope of practice beyond 
the limits set by the Legislature. It is the prerogative 
of the Legislature to make such a change. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE 
OBSTETRICS; AND IF SO QUALIFIED, THEY CANNOT 
USE DRUGS, MEDICINE OR SURGERY. 
Section 58-12-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
that if an individual who has applied for a licence to 
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practice the treatment of human ailments without the 
use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery 
successfully passes the examination in obstetrics, his 
license shall set forth his right to practice obstetrics. The 
plaintiffs assume that the only interpretation to be put 
on this provision is that a person so licensed must use 
drugs, medicine and surgery in the practice of obstetrics. 
This conclusion does not necessarily follow. It is a 
matter of common knowledge that the midwife has prac-
ticed obstetrics in this State for many years even until 
the present time without medicine, drugs or surgery. It 
is also a matter of common knowledge that in recent 
years there has been a considerable amount of writings 
by medical professionals extolling the virtues of natural, 
painless childbirth achieved through psychiatry andjor 
hypnotic suggestion. In view of these known things, it 
is not at all incompatible ''ith the concept of." drugless 
healing" to authorize a naturopath to practice obstetrics 
without the use of drugs or medicine and without opera-
tive surgery. 
It is to be noted that \Yebster 's International Dic-
tionan· defines "obstetrics" as the "science of mid-
wifer~T; the art of assisting women in parturition; mid-
\Yifery; the management of pregnancy and labor.·· 
It is adn1itted hy plaintiffs that the only exan1ina-
tion to test the qualifications of naturopaths to practice 
obstetrics has been giYen by the naturopath rommittee 
established by Section 58-1-5(11). Ho,vever, Section 
58-1-5(9) provides: 
''For practitioners of medicine and surger:· 
in all branches thereof, and for the practice of 
8 
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obstetrics only, a committee of five persons each 
of whom shall be a licensed practitioner of medi-
cine and surgery in all branches thereof in this 
state * * *." 
This foregoing section is the only place where the licens-
ing statutes mention the committee or group that shall 
be concerned with the practice of obstetrics. Certainly, 
the Legislature did not intend to have various groups and 
committees each examining applicants for the purpose 
of practicing obstetrics in accordance with the particular 
committee's views on the subject. There would not be 
any uniform standard of qualification or practice which 
would most certainly range from the use of hypnosis to 
the use of surgery. It is submitted that the Legislature 
intended that the qualification of all persons desiring to 
practice obstetrics should be tested by one committee 
and that committee is the one created by Section 
58-1-5(9), cited above. These plaintiffs have not been so 
qualified. 
The plaintiffs seek some help for their position by 
referring to Section 58-12-3, which uses the wordR "with-
out operative surgery.'' The point of their argument 
being to the effect that by implication, they may practice 
surgery as long as it is not ''operative surgery.'' The 
only case coming to our attention where a statute using 
the words "operative surgery" has been construed by a 
court is the ease of State v. 1'hierfelder, 114 Mont. 104, 
132 P. 2d 1035, 1041, where the court said: 
''According to all medical authorities 'opera-
tive surgery' includes both major and minor 
surgery." 
As far as obstetrics IS concerned, plaintiffs have not 
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classified the surgery which they consider has been au-
thorized them by that part of the licensing statute. (For 
other cases, see opinion of Attorney General, #55-101, 
attached to petition.) 
POINT IV 
THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
REGISTRATION IS NOT A LICENSE REVOCATION 
PROCEEDING, BUT MERELY ONE TO MAKE THE 
LICENSE ISSUED CONFORM TO THE LAW. 
In Point Five in their brief, plaintiffs assume that 
the threatened action of the defendants is one of revo-
cation of outstanding licenses. \Y e say that it is not a 
revocation proceeding. The Department has determined 
that through inadvertence, mistake, or incorrect advice, 
licenses have been issued which purport to grant to 
plaintiffs the right to practice in a professional area for 
which they are not authorized to apply and which the 
Department is not authorized to issue. It is a funda-
mental proposition that if an agency attempts to issue a 
license without authority, the license is void. All of the 
licensing authority ·which the Department holds has been 
delegated by the Legislature, and an attempted e::den-
sion of the authority by the Department is a nullity. 
Plaintiffs' Point Five deals with the revocation for 
ca n~e of licenses othen,Tisc validly issued. In this case, 
the only action threatened is to put proper limits on the 
license and not to revoke any license. 
Plaintiffs also assent in thPir Point Fin: that no 
q IIP~-d ion of public health lw.s been raisPL1, nor has any 
question of qna1ifieation of plaintiffs been raisf'(1. Of 
10 
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course, a failure to raise the question of qualification or 
public health does not mean that such questions do not 
exist. However, since this action (of the Department) is 
not a revocation proceeding but rnerely to make the 
license conform to the licensing authority of the Depart-
ment, it makes no difference vd1ether plajntiffs are quali-
fied or not. If the Department does not have the autlwrity 
to license plaintiffs under their applications, to engage 
in the extended practice, then it makes no difference how 
qualified the applicant is. If plaintiffs wish to practice 
medicine and surgery, in all of its branches, let them so 
apply and demonstrate their qualifications. However, 
since plaintiffs have applied to be licensed to practice 
the "treatment of human ailments without drugs or medi-
cine and u·ithout operative surgery," then let their 
licenses and practice be so limited. The prohibitive and 
limiting words are so clear in our licensing statute that 
there is not any reasonable room to say that they do 
not mean that these plaintiffs must confine their practice 
to the treatment of human ailments without drugs or 
medicine and without operative surgery. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' application for a writ of mandamus should 
be denied, and order heretofore issued to the defendant 
should be quashed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
PETER J\!L LOWE 
Deputy Attorney G('ueral 
AttoniP?JS for n('j('J/(1a11ts 
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